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1. Introduction 
Japan’s economy has been stagnant more or less continuously for more than a 
decade (Japan’s so-called “Lost Decade”), and Japan’s growth rate during this period has 
been the lowest among the major industrialized countries of the world.  During the 
1995-2002 period, for example, the annualized growth rate of Japan’s real gross domestic 
product (GDP) averaged only 1.2%, which is lower than all of the other G7 
countries—Canada (3.4%), the United States (3.2%), the United Kingdom (2.7%), France 
(2.3%), Italy (1.8%), and Germany (1.4%)--as well as the Euro area average (2.2%) and 
less than half of all of the other larger OECD countries—Korea (5.3%), Australia (3.8%), 
Spain (3.3%), the Netherlands (2.9%), and Mexico (2.6%)--as well as the OECD-wide 
average (2.7%).   
Figure 1 shows trends over time in the annual growth rate of real GDP and 
household consumption during the 1980-2003 period and, as can be seen from this figure, 
GDP growth was relatively high during the 1980-1991 period (the so-called bubble period) 
and much lower during the 1991-2003 period (the so-called post-bubble period).  This is 
verified by the first column of Table 1, which shows that GDP growth averaged a full 
3.89% during the 1980-91 period but only 1.14% (less than a third of the 1980-1991 level) 
during the 1991-2003 period.  
What caused the sharp decline in GDP growth, and what caused it to persist for 
more than a decade?  In this paper, I attempt to shed light on the causes of the prolonged 
slowdown of the Japanese economy in the 1990s by analyzing demand side data on the 
sources of growth of GDP and the sources of growth of household consumption in 
conjunction with similar data on the immediately preceding 1980-1991 period.  By so 
doing, I attempt to assess whether, and to what extent, the stagnation of household 
consumption is responsible for the prolonged slowdown of the Japanese economy.  I then 
speculate about the causes of the stagnation of household consumption, and after devoting 
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the bulk of the paper to demand side factors, I turn finally to a consideration of the relative 
importance of demand side and supply side factors as causes of the prolonged slowdown of 
the Japanese economy.  
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 considers the sources of growth of 
GDP, section 3 considers the sources of growth of household consumption, section 4 
considers possible causes of the stagnation of household consumption, section 5 considers 
whether  demand side or supply side factors contributed more to the prolonged slowdown 
of the Japanese economy, and section 6 is a brief concluding section. 
To preview the main findings of this paper, I find that the stagnation of investment, 
especially private fixed investment, was the major culprit of the prolonged slowdown of the 
Japanese economy in the 1990s and that the stagnation of spending on clothing and 
footwear, transport, and to a lesser extent, miscellaneous goods and services, education, and 
food and non-alcoholic beverages were the main culprits of the stagnation of household 
consumption.  By contrast, I find that the main factors holding up GDP growth were 
household consumption, government consumption, and net exports and that the main 
factors holding up household consumption growth were spending on health, 
communication, and to a lesser extent, restaurants and hotels and housing-related 
expenditures.  I also find that the stagnation of household consumption was due primarily 
to the stagnation of household disposable income, the decline in household wealth (which 
in turn was due primarily to the collapse of land and equity prices), and to a lesser extent, 
increased uncertainty about the future (especially about old age in general and public 
old-age pensions in particular), the deterioration of future prospects, etc.  Finally, I 
consider whether demand side factors or supply side factors were more important as causes 
of the prolonged slowdown of the Japanese economy in the 1990s and conclude that the 
former (especially misguided government policies) were probably more important. 
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2. An Analysis of the Sources of GDP Growth 
In this section, I analyze the sources of GDP growth during the 1991-2003 period 
and consider the extent to which the stagnation of household consumption was responsible 
for the prolonged slowdown of the Japanese economy.   
For the purposes of this analysis, I decompose gross domestic product (GDP) into 
the following six components: actual final consumption of households (hereafter referred to 
as “household consumption”), government actual final consumption (“government 
consumption”), private gross domestic fixed capital formation (“private fixed investment”), 
public gross domestic fixed capital formation (“government fixed investment”), changes in 
inventories (“inventory investment”), and net exports of goods and services (“net exports”).  
Household consumption differs from the standard concept in that it includes “social 
transfers in kind,” which consist of “social benefits in kind” (health insurance and nursing 
care insurance benefits, which are used to finance the consumption of medical and nursing 
care services by households) and “transfers of individual non-market goods and services” 
from the government (such as subsidies for textbooks, public day care centers, etc.) and 
from private non-profit institutions serving households (such as subsidies for private 
nursery schools, art museums, zoos, etc.).  Since both types of consumption are ultimately 
for the benefit of households, it seems preferable to include them in household 
consumption.?  Conversely, government consumption differs from the standard concept in 
that it excludes social transfers in kind from the government to households. 
Looking first at Figure 1, it can be seen from this figure that the growth rate of 
household consumption exceeded that of GDP in eight out of the twelve years during the 
1991-2003 period.  This suggests that household consumption did not act as a drag on the 
economy and rather that it prevented it from stagnating further.   
The first two columns of Table 1 show the average annualized real growth rate 
(hereafter referred to as “growth rate”) of GDP and the various components thereof during 
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the 1980-91 and 1991-2003 periods.  Looking first at the 1991-2003 period, the growth 
rate of GDP during this period was a mere 1.14%, whereas the growth rate of household 
consumption was 1.56%.  Thus, the growth rate of household consumption was somewhat 
higher than that of GDP during the 1991-2003 period, which provides further corroboration 
that household consumption did not act as a drag on the economy and in fact raised rather 
than lowering the growth rate of GDP.?  Note, however, that the growth rate of household 
consumption was not very high in absolute terms, that it was not nearly as high as the 
growth rate of certain other components of GDP such as net exports (6.39%) and 
government consumption (3.22%), and that it ranked only third among the six components 
of GDP.   
What did act as a drag on the economy was investment--private and government 
fixed investment as well as inventory investment, all of which showed slower growth than 
GDP and in fact all of which showed negative growth during the 1991-2003 period: -0.24% 
in the case of government fixed investment, -0.59% in the case of private fixed investment, 
and very negative but not calculable in the case of inventory investment (because it was 
negative in the terminal year).  A breakdown of private fixed investment shows that 
private housing (dwelling) investment declined especially sharply (-2.48% as opposed to 
-0.14% in the case of plant and equipment investment), which suggests that sluggish private 
housing investment might have been the primary culprit of the prolonged slowdown of the 
Japanese economy.   
The third and fourth columns of Table 1 show the contribution to real GDP growth 
of each component thereof during the 1980-91 and 1991-2003 periods.  Looking first at 
the 1991-2003 period, household consumption made by far the largest contribution to real 
GDP growth (85.40%).  Government consumption made the second largest contribution 
(18.64%), and net exports made the third largest contribution (13.07%).  Some have 
claimed that strong export growth prevented the prolonged slowdown of the Japanese 
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economy from becoming even worse, but the contribution of net exports to real GDP 
growth was relatively modest and it ranked only third.  The contributions of government 
fixed investment (-1.26%), inventory investment (-4.35%), and private fixed investment 
(-11.49%) to real GDP growth were all negative, with the contribution of private fixed 
investment being especially large in absolute magnitude.  A breakdown of private fixed 
investment shows that private housing investment was responsible for 81% of the negative 
contribution of private fixed investment, suggesting again that it was the primary culprit of 
the prolonged slowdown of the Japanese economy. 
Some of the foregoing results concerning the growth rate of each component of 
GDP and its contribution to real GDP growth are seemingly at odds with one other, but the 
differences can be explained by the share of each component in total GDP.  For example, 
household consumption made by far the largest contribution to real GDP growth even 
though it ranks only third with respect to growth rates simply because it is by far the largest 
component of GDP with a share of more than 60% (see Table 2).  Conversely, the 
contribution of net exports to real GDP growth was only third highest even though its 
growth rate was by far the highest of any component of GDP simply because its share of 
GDP is so small (3% or less, which puts it in fifth place among the six components of 
GDP). 
Next, I compare the sources of growth of the Japanese economy during the 
1991-2003 period to those during the immediately preceding 1980-91 period.  Looking 
first at the  growth rates of GDP and its components (compare the first and second 
columns of Table 1), the  growth rate of GDP during the 1991-2003 period was less than a 
third of what it was during the 1980-91 period (1.14% vs. 3.89%).  Household 
consumption showed the third highest growth rate of any component of GDP in both time 
periods, but its growth rate was much lower in absolute terms during the 1991-2003 period 
than it was during the 1980-91 period (1.56% vs. 3.59%).  Even so, the growth rate of 
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household consumption exceeded that of GDP during the 1991-2003 period whereas it fell 
slightly short of that of GDP during the 1980-91 period. 
If we compare the growth rates of the remaining components of GDP during the 
two time periods, the growth rate of net exports was much higher during the 1991-2003 
period than it was during the 1980-91 period, and its rank was also much higher (first vs. 
sixth).  Similarly, the growth rate of government consumption was only slightly lower 
during the 1991-2003 period than it was during the 1980-91 period, and its rank was quite a 
bit higher (second vs. fourth).  By contrast, the growth rates of the investment-related 
components of GDP (private fixed investment, government fixed investment, and inventory 
investment) were all negative during the 1991-2003 period even though they were all 
positive and inventory investment and private fixed investment ranked first and second, 
respectively, during the 1980-91 period.   
Turning next to a comparison of the contribution to real GDP growth of each 
component of GDP during the two time periods (compare the third and fourth columns of 
Table 1), and looking first at household consumption, household consumption made by far 
the largest contribution to real GDP growth during both time periods, but its contribution 
was much larger during the 1991-2003 period than during the 1980-1991 period (85.40% vs. 
57.24%) even though its growth rate was much lower than during the 1980-91 period and 
even though its growth rate was so low in absolute terms because the growth rate of GDP 
was even lower and because its share of GDP is by far the largest of any component of 
GDP. 
Government consumption and net exports made the second and third largest 
contributions to real GDP growth during the 1991-2003 period even though their 
contributions were only the third and sixth largest during the 1980-91 period, and the 
magnitudes of their contributions were also much larger during the 1991-2003 period than 
during the 1980-91 period.  By contrast, private fixed investment, government fixed 
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investment, and inventory investment (especially private fixed investment) all made 
negative contributions to real GDP growth during the 1991-2003 period even though their 
contributions were positive during the 1980-91 period.  The most striking case is that of 
private fixed investment, whose contribution to real GDP growth was a full 34.09% during 
the 1980-91 period but -11.49% during the 1991-2003 period, a decline of 45.58 percentage 
points!  This indicates how volatile investment has been and suggests that investment 
(especially private fixed investment) may have been the main culprit of the slowdown of 
the Japanese economy after 1991. 
To examine this contention more directly, I next analyze the change in the average 
annualized real growth rate of each component of GDP and the contribution of each 
component of GDP to the decline in real GDP growth between 1980-91 and 1991-2003.  
Looking first at the change in growth rates (see the first column of Table 3), the growth rate 
of consumption declined by 2.03 percentage points between 1980-91 and 1991-2003, which 
is considerably less than the decline in the growth rate of GDP (2.75 percentage points).  
This confirms my earlier contention that household consumption did not act as a drag on 
the economy. 
Looking at the change in the growth rates of the other components of GDP, net 
exports were the only component showing an increase in its growth rate (by 5.60 
percentage points).  The other components of GDP all showed declines in their growth 
rates: 0.32 percentage points in the case of government consumption, 1.09 percentage 
points in the case of government fixed investment, 6.70 percentage points in the case of 
private fixed investment, and not calculable but large in the case of inventory investment.  
A closer look at private fixed investment shows that the decline in the growth rate of private 
plant and equipment investment (-7.59%) was much larger in absolute magnitude than the 
decline in the growth rate of private housing investment (-4.92%), which appears to 
contradict my earlier contention that the decline in private housing investment was the 
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primary cause of the slowdown of the Japanese economy in the 1990s. 
Turning finally to the contribution of each component of GDP to the decline in real 
GDP growth between 1980-91 and 1991-2003 (see the second column of Table 3), private 
fixed investment made by far the largest contribution to the decline in real GDP growth 
(67.91%), followed by household consumption in second place (36.34%), inventory 
investment in third place (5.22%), and government fixed investment in fourth place 
(3.84%).  The contributions of the remaining components of GDP (government 
consumption and net exports) to the decline in real GDP growth were negative, meaning 
that they held up real GDP growth and prevented it from falling further.  A closer look at 
private fixed investment shows that the contribution of private plant and equipment 
investment to the decline in real GDP growth (54.86%) was much larger than the 
contribution of private housing investment (13.05%), which casts further doubt on my 
earlier contention that the decline in private housing investment was the primary cause of 
the prolonged slowdown of the Japanese economy in the 1990s. 
These results confirm that private fixed investment and, to a lesser extent, 
government fixed investment and inventory investment were the main culprits of the 
prolonged slowdown of the Japanese economy in the 1990s, that net exports and 
government consumption prevented the slowdown from becoming even worse, and that 
household consumption was somewhere in the middle, contributing the most to real GDP 
growth but, at the same time, contributing substantially to the decline in real GDP growth. 
A detailed analysis of the reasons why private fixed investment was the main 
culprit of the prolonged slowdown of the Japanese economy during the 1990s is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but previous studies have attributed it to a combination of factors 
including (1) the sharp curtailment of bank lending (the so-called “credit crunch”) and the 
increase in systemic risk, both of which were caused by the financial crisis and the 
proliferation of non-performing loans, which in turn were caused by the collapse of the 
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bubble economy of the late 1980s and the subsequent decline in asset (land and equity) 
prices, (2) a further curtailment of bank lending due to the untimely introduction of the 
Basel guidelines for capital adequacy in 1993, (3) the inadequacy of government actions 
aimed at resolving the financial crisis and the non-performing loan problem, (4) the 
inadequacy of aggregate demand due in large part to the inadequacy of monetary and fiscal 
stimuli, (5) increased uncertainty about future prospects for the Japanese economy as well 
as increased volatility, and (6) massive overinvestment in corporate plant and equipment 
during the bubble years (due in large part to overly expansionary monetary policy), which 
induced firms to sharply curtail fixed investment during the post-bubble years as a way of 
reducing excess capacity in the corporate sector (see section 5 for more details).  
Saito (2000) does a similar analysis for the earlier postwar period and finds that 
household consumption made the largest contribution to real GDP growth during the earlier 
postwar period as well but that its contribution (and also the contribution of government 
consumption) were not as large as they were after 1991.  Thus, the role played by 
household (and government) consumption during the post-1991 period was large not only 
in absolute terms but also relative to the earlier postwar period.    
 
3. An Analysis of the Sources of Consumption Growth 
I turn next to an analysis of the sources of growth of household consumption.  I 
break household consumption down into twelve components using the same classification 
scheme used in the National Accounts of Japan.  In this section, I use the same concept of 
household consumption used in the previous section except that I exclude “transfers of 
individual non-market goods and services” from the government and from private 
non-profit institutions serving households to households because a detailed breakdown 
thereof by purpose is not available for all years.  However, I do include “social benefits in 
kind” in household consumption and, in particular, I include them in the “health” 
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component of household consumption because they consist of health insurance and nursing 
care insurance benefits,  which are used to finance the consumption of medical and 
nursing care services by households.? 
The first two columns of Table 4 show data on the average annualized real growth 
rate of each component of household consumption during the 1980-91 and 1991-2003 
periods, and looking first at the 1991-2003 period, “communication” (11.69%) showed by 
far the most rapid growth during this period (because of the rapid diffusion of cell phones), 
and “health” (3.66%), “recreation and culture” (2.99%), “housing, electricity, gas and water 
supply” (2.19%), and “restaurants and hotels” (1.88%) also grew faster than overall 
consumption (1.54%), thereby boosting it.  By contrast, “furnishings, household 
equipment and household services” (1.12%), “miscellaneous goods and services” (0.66%), 
“transport” (0.53%), “food and non-alcoholic beverages” (-0.02%), “alcoholic beverages 
and tobacco” (-0.17%), “education” (-1.15%), and “clothing and footwear” (-2.73%) grew 
less slowly than overall consumption, thereby serving as a drag thereon. 
The third and fourth columns of Table 4 show the contribution of each component 
of household consumption to real household consumption growth during the 1980-91 and 
1991-2003 periods, respectively, and looking first at the 1991-2003 period, “housing, 
electricity, gas and water supply” made the largest contribution (30.11%) because it showed 
the fourth highest growth rate and because it has by far the largest share (see Table 5), while 
“health” made the second largest contribution (26.80%) because it showed the second 
highest growth rate and because it has one of the largest shares.  The relatively large 
contribution of housing-related expenditures was due primarily to the increase in the 
imputed rent on owner-occupied housing (imputed services of owner-occupied dwellings).  
Imputed rent grew at a rate of 2.34% (vs. 2.19% in the case of housing-related expenditures 
as a whole), its share of housing-related expenditures is about 70%, and its contribution to 
real household consumption growth was 22.65% (vs. 30.11% in the case of housing-related 
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expenditures as a whole).  Imputed rent on owner-occupied housing is likely to be 
mismeasured because it is not a market transaction but rather is imputed using various 
assumptions, and I doubt that it grew as rapidly as the official figures suggest during a 
period when land prices were declining steadily.  Thus, the fact that imputed rent on 
owner-occupied housing was the single largest source of growth of household consumption 
during the 1991-2003 period, according to the official figures, suggests that there is 
considerable uncertainty about exactly how much consumption grew during this period. 
“Recreation and culture” made the third largest contribution (21.76%) because its 
growth rate was the third highest and because its share is the third or fourth largest, while 
“communication” made the fourth largest contribution (15.32%) even though its share is 
one of the smallest because its growth rate was by far the highest.  “Restaurants and 
hotels” made the fifth largest contribution (7.36%), followed by “miscellaneous goods and 
services,” “furnishings, household equipment and household services,” and “transport.”  
By contrast. “food and non-alcoholic beverages,” “alcoholic beverages and tobacco,” 
“education,” and “clothing” all made negative contributions, with the negative contribution 
of clothing being the largest in absolute magnitude (-9.83%).   
Next, I compare the sources of growth of household consumption during the 
1991-2003 period to those during the immediately preceding 1980-91 period.  Looking 
first at the growth rates of each component of household consumption in the two periods 
(compare the first two columns in Table 4), the growth rate of household consumption as a 
whole declined from 3.61% in 1980-91 to 1.54% in 1991-2003.  “Communication” 
showed the highest growth rate during both periods, but its growth rate increased sharply.  
“Health” increased from sixth to second, “housing, electricity, gas and water supply” from 
seventh to fourth, and “restaurants and hotels” from ninth to fifth, even though the growth 
rates of the first two of these components declined.  By contrast, “furnishings, household 
equipment and household services” declined from third to sixth, “miscellaneous goods and 
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services” from third to seventh, “transport” from fifth to eighth, and “clothing and 
footwear” from eighth to twelfth (last place), with the growth rates of these components 
declining sharply.  Finally, “recreation and culture,” “food and non-alcoholic beverages,” 
“alcoholic beverages and tobacco,” and “education” showed little change in their ranks but 
their growth rates declined considerably. 
Looking next at the contribution of each component to the growth of real 
household consumption in the two periods (compare the third and fourth columns of Table 
4), the contribution of “housing, electricity, gas and water supply” increased sharply, 
allowing it to maintain its number one ranking, the contribution of “recreation and culture” 
increased somewhat but its rank fell from second to third nonetheless, and the contribution 
of “health” more than doubled, allowing it to increase its rank from fifth to second.  
“Communication” and “restaurants and hotels” showed sharp increases in their ranks as 
well as their contributions, whereas “miscellaneous goods and services,” “furnishings, 
household equipment and household services,” “transport,” “food and non-alcoholic 
beverages,” and “clothing and footwear” showed declines in their ranks as well as their 
contributions.  Finally, “alcoholic beverages and tobacco” and “education” showed little 
change in either their ranks or their contributions.   
I next analyze the change in the average annualized real growth rate of each 
component of household consumption and the contribution of each component to the 
decline in the real growth of household consumption between 1980-91 and 1991-2003.  
Looking first at the change in growth rates (see the first column of Table 6), the growth rate 
of household consumption as a whole declined by 2.06 percentage points between 1980-91 
and 1991-2003, and the change in the growth rates of each component should be compared 
against this standard.  The only components of household consumption showing increases 
in their growth rates between the two time periods were “communication” (an increase of 
3.77 percentage points) and “restaurants and hotels” (an increase of 0.10 percentage points), 
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but “health,” “food and non-alcoholic beverages,” “alcoholic beverages and tobacco,” and 
“housing, electricity, gas and water supply” showed smaller declines in their growth rates 
(in absolute magnitude) than  overall consumption, thereby propping up consumption, 
whereas “education,” “furnishings, household equipment and household services,” 
“clothing and footwear,” “recreation and culture,” “transport,” and “miscellaneous goods 
and services” showed sharper declines in their growth rates (in absolute magnitude) than 
overall consumption, thereby contributing to its decline. 
Turning finally to the contribution of each component to the decline in the real 
growth of household consumption between the two periods (see the second column of Table 
6), “transport” contributed the most to the decline in real household consumption growth 
(31.18%), followed by “miscellaneous goods and services,” “clothing and footwear,” “food 
and non-alcoholic beverages,” “furnishings, household equipment and household services,” 
“recreation and culture,” “housing, electricity, gas and water supply,” “education,” and 
“alcoholic beverages and tobacco.”  “Restaurants and hotels,” “health,” and 
“communication” made negative contributions to the decline in household consumption 
(i.e., propped up real growth in household consumption), with the contributions of 
“communication” and “health” being especially large in absolute magnitude. 
To sum up, the relative importance of the various components of household 
consumption differs depending on which criterion is used to rank them, but the components 
that rank relatively high with respect to virtually all criteria include “communication” and 
“health” and, to a lesser extent, “restaurants and hotels” and “housing, electricity, gas and 
water supply,” while the components that rank relatively low with respect to virtually all 
criteria include “clothing and footwear,” “transport,” and, to a lesser extent, “miscellaneous 
goods and services,” “education.,” and “food and non-alcoholic beverages.”  
With the exception of housing-related expenditures, necessities (such as “clothing 
and footwear,” and “food and non-alcoholic beverages”) were the most stagnant and 
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contributed the most to the stagnation of household consumption during the 1991-2003 
period, whereas with the exception of “transport” and “education,” luxuries (such as 
“health,” “recreation and culture,” “communication,” and “restaurants and hotels”) showed 
the strongest growth and contributed the most to holding up household consumption during 
this period.  Thus, somewhat surprisingly, consumption patterns became more affluent 
during the 1991-2003 period despite the stagnation of household income and wealth, 
suggesting that the prolonged slowdown of the Japanese economy was not severe enough to 
impoverish Japanese households.  However, it could be that the increasing affluence of 
consumption patterns is attributable to an increase in income and wealth disparities among 
Japanese households, and if this explanation is the correct one, it implies that the poor 
became even poorer.? 
Changes in relative prices seem to be able to explain some of the observed patterns 
in household consumption.  For example, the average annualized inflation rates of 
“communication” and “recreation and culture” were negative and large in absolute 
magnitude (-3.78% and -3.39%, respectively), and thus, assuming that the demand for these 
components is relatively price-elastic, the negative inflation rates can help explain why the 
consumption of these components increased relatively rapidly.  By contrast, the inflation 
rate of “education” was positive and large in absolute magnitude (2.34%), and thus, 
assuming that the demand for education is relatively price-elastic, the high inflation rate 
thereof can help explain why the consumption thereof declined absolutely.   
Another possible influence on consumption patterns is demographic trends.  The 
sharp decline in the birth rate has reduced the share of the young in the total population, and 
this in turn will reduce the demand for education, and conversely, sharp increases in life 
expectancy have increased the share of the aged in the total population, and this in turn will 
increase the demand for health-related expenditures. 
Yet another possible influence on consumption patterns is technological change.  
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For example, there were rapid improvements in cell phone and internet technology during 
the 1991-2003 period, which in turn led to sharp price declines and the introduction of new 
products and features like cell phones with email, internet, camera, and video capabilities.  
The rapid increase in communication-related expenditures is presumably due in large part 
to the price declines and new products and features made possible by rapid advances in cell 
phone and internet technology. 
 
4. The Causes of the Stagnation of Household Consumption  
In section 2, we found that household consumption did not cause the prolonged 
slowdown in the Japanese economy, but it is nonetheless true that household consumption 
was relative stagnant during this period.  In this section, we analyze the causes of the 
stagnation of household consumption during the 1991-2003 period (see Bank of Japan 
Research Department (1998) for more details). 
Economic theory predicts that household consumption will be influenced by the 
following factors, among others: (1) household disposable income, (2) household wealth, 
(3) uncertainty about the future (for example, about income, employment, retirement, 
public old-age pensions, etc.), and (4) future prospects (for example, about income, 
employment, etc.). 
These factors may have contributed to the stagnation of household consumption 
during the 1991-2003 period if (1) household disposable income had declined or been 
stagnant, (2) household wealth had declined, (3) uncertainty about the future had increased, 
or (4) future prospects had deteriorated during this period.  We look at each of these 
factors in turn. 
 
(1) The Stagnation of Household Disposable Income 
The average annualized real growth rate of household disposable income was only 
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0.98% during the 1991-2003 period, which is far less than the average annualized real 
growth rate of household consumption during the same period (1.56%) and also far less 
than the average annualized real growth rate of household disposable income during the 
1980-91 period (3.32%).?  This suggests that the stagnation of household disposable 
income was a major cause of the stagnation of household consumption and that it would 
have caused household consumption to be even more stagnant had it not been for other 
factors operating in the opposite direction.  
  
(2) The Decline in Household Wealth 
Household wealth (net worth) declined during the 1991-2003 period as a whole, 
due largely to the sharp decline in land and equity prices, and the average annualized real 
rate of decline of household wealth during this period was 0.39%.??  Thus, it is quite 
possible that the stagnation of household consumption during this period was due at least 
partly to the decline in household wealth (a reverse wealth effect). 
 
(3) Increased Uncertainty about the Future 
If the stagnation of household consumption were due to increased uncertainty 
about the future, we would expect the household saving rate to have increased, but in fact it 
declined steadily and sharply during the 1991-2003 period (except during the 1996-98 
period)--from 15.1% in 1991 to 6.4% in 2002 in the case of the unadjusted rate and from 
13.3% in 1991 to 5.4% in 2002 in the case of the adjusted rate, a decrease of more than 
50% in both cases (see Table 7)!?  This suggests that the stagnation of household 
consumption is not due to increased uncertainty about the future, except possibly during the 
1996-98 period, when the household saving rate increased from 9.9% to 11.1% in the case 
of the unadjusted rate and from 8.5% to 9.6% in the case of the adjusted rate.?  It is not 
surprising to find that the household saving rate showed a temporary upturn during the 
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1996-98 period because it is during this period that a spate of bankruptcies (most notably 
the bankruptcies of Yamaichi Securities and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in November 1997) 
occurred in the financial sector.  These bankruptcies caused increased uncertainty not only 
about the health of the financial sector but also about the employment situation because the 
bankruptcies entailed large-scale layoffs of workers.  
Additional verification of the importance of uncertainty about the future can be 
obtained from data on saving motives, etc., from the Public Opinion Survey on Financial 
Assets and Liabilities, conducted annually by the Central Council for Financial Services 
Information.  As Table 8 shows, the proportion of respondents saving for illness and 
unforeseen emergencies has not shown a clear trend over time, and the proportion saving 
for peace of mind increased only moderately and only until 1999, which provides further 
corroboration that increased uncertainty about the future is not a major cause of the 
stagnation of household consumption.  However, Table 8 also shows that the proportion of 
respondents saving for old age has increased sharply over time (from 50.5% in 1991 to 
60.4% in 2003), and moreover, Table 9 shows that the proportion of under-60 respondents 
who are worried about old age has increased sharply over time, from 63.7% in 1992 to 
87.9% in 2003 and that the proportion of these respondents who are worried about old age 
because pensions and insurance are not adequate increased from 55.5% to 72.2% over the 
same time period, making it the reason that increased the most in importance.??  This 
suggests that increased uncertainty about old age and about old-age pensions did contribute 
toward the stagnation of household consumption.  
In a related line of research, Horioka and Watanabe (1997) and Horioka, et al. 
(2000) calculate the amount of saving for each motive and find that the retirement and 
precautionary motives are by far the most important motives for saving and that they are far 
more important in Japan than they are in the United States.  Similarly, Horioka, Murakami, 
and Kohara (2002) and Horioka, Kohara, and Murakami (2004) find that dissaving is the 
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most common way in which the Japanese deal with unforeseen emergencies, which 
corroborates the importance of the precautionary motive as a motive for saving in Japan 
from the other side of the ledger. 
A number of studies have analyzed the importance in Japan of precautionary 
saving arising from various types of uncertainty.  For example, Ginama (1988), Ogawa 
(1991), Doi (2001), and Zhou (2003) analyze the importance of precautionary saving 
arising from income risk.  Ginama (1988), Ogawa (1991), and Zhou (2003) find that 
precautionary saving arising from income risk is relatively unimportant except at the time 
of the first oil crisis and except for the self-employed and farmers, and Doi (2003) finds 
that it is of some importance in the case of salaried worker households but that employment 
risk is not important (but see also the next subsection).  Murata (2003a, 2003b) looks at 
the importance of precautionary saving arising from uncertainty about overall economic 
conditions and from uncertainty about public old-age pensions and finds that the former is 
not important but that the latter is.  Nakagawa (1999) analyzes the importance of different 
types of uncertainty on the household saving rate in Japan by age and income and finds that 
different types of uncertainties are important for different age and income groups: he finds 
that income risk is important for the low- to middle-income, that employment risk is 
important for the middle-aged and aged low-income, that uncertainty about public old-age 
pensions is important for the young, and that the risk of becoming bedridden is important 
for the aged.  Finally, Saito and Shiratsuka (2003a, 2003b) analyze the impact of various 
types of uncertainty on the household saving rate and find that uncertainty about 
employment and price deflation and, to a lesser extent, overall uncertainty and uncertainty 
about income exert upward pressure on the household saving rate.??  
Thus, the available evidence is not always consistent, but it suggests that 
precautionary saving arising from income risk or employment risk has generally not been 
all that important nor has it increased over time but that precautionary saving arising from 
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uncertainty about old age in general and about public old-age pensions in particular is 
important and has increased over time and hence that it may have contributed to the 
stagnation of household consumption during the 1990s.  
 
(4) The Deterioration of Future Prospects 
 In the previous subsection, we discussed the impact of increased uncertainty 
concerning the future, but a closely related factor is the deterioration of future prospects.  
If household expectations concerning future incomes, future employment prospects, etc., 
deteriorate, this should cause them to reduce their current consumption.  In addition to 
looking at the impact of income and employment uncertainty, Doi (2001, 2003) also looks 
at the impact of the deterioration of income and employment prospects on the household 
saving rate in Japan and finds that reduced employment prospects have had a positive and 
significant impact on Japan’s household saving rate but that the impact of reduced income 
prospects is marginal at best.  Japan’s unemployment rate has increased steadily 
throughout the 1990s, reaching its highest level ever (5.5%) in August 2002 and declining 
only moderately thereafter.  Thus, Doi’s finding that reduced employment prospects have 
induced Japanese households to save more and consume less is not at all surprising.  
 
(5) Other Factors 
Turning finally to other factors that may have influenced the level of household 
consumption, (1) the profits of individual proprietors have been stagnant during the current 
slowdown, putting a damper on the consumption of individual proprietors and (2) 
deflationary expectations concerning consumer prices may have depressed household 
consumption because consumer prices have been falling since the mid-1990s (with the 
exception of 1997) and price deflation means that the longer one waits, the cheaper one can 
buy a given item.  By contrast, (3) price deflation might actually stimulate household 
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consumption because it increases the real value of household asset holdings; (4) near-zero 
(nominal) interest rates may have depressed household saving and boosted household 
consumption to the extent that the interest elasticity of saving is positive, (5) the rapid aging 
of the population may also have boosted household consumption because the elderly 
typically finance their living expenses in large part by decumulating their previously 
accumulated savings, as a result of which their propensity to consume is typically higher 
than that of the working-age population, and (6) the introduction of a public nursing care 
insurance program in 2000 may have weakened the perceived need to save, thereby 
boosting consumption.  Thus, there are factors working in both directions, and the factors 
that exert upward pressure on household consumption have presumably prevented the 
stagnation of household consumption from becoming worse than it would have been 
otherwise. 
 
(6) Summary 
In sum, the evidence suggests that the stagnation of household disposable income 
and the decline in household wealth (the latter of which was due primarily to the collapse of 
land and equity prices) appear to have been the main causes of the stagnation of household 
consumption during the 1990s.  Increased uncertainty about the future does not appear to 
have been a major cause of the stagnation of household consumption during the decade as a 
whole, but it does appear to have been of some importance during the 1996-98 period, and 
increased uncertainty about old age in general and about public old-age pensions in 
particular may have contributed to the stagnation of household consumption during the 
period as a whole.   
 
5. Demand Side vs. Supply Side Factors 
Thus far, I have focused on the demand side in my search for the causes of the 
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prolonged slowdown of the Japanese economy in the 1990s, and many other authors 
including Bayoumi (2001), Harada and Iwata (2002), Noguchi (2002, 2004), Posen (1998), 
and Takemori (2002) also emphasize the importance of demand side factors.  However, 
other authors including Hayashi (2003), Hayashi and Prescott (2002), Kawamoto (2004), 
Kobayashi and Inada (2005), Kobayashi and Katou (2001), Miyagawa (2003, 2004), and 
Ogawa (2003) emphasize the importance of supply side factors (see Miyao (2006) for a 
concise and useful survey??). 
Authors who find that demand side factors are more important as explanations of 
the prolonged slowdown of the Japanese economy emphasize the importance of such 
factors as (1) the sharp curtailment in bank lending (the so-called “credit crunch”) and the 
increase in systemic risk, both of which were caused by the financial crisis and the 
proliferation of non-performing loans, which in turn were caused by the collapse of the 
bubble economy of the late 1980s and the subsequent decline in asset (land and equity) 
prices, (2) a further curtailment of bank lending due to the untimely introduction of the 
Basel guidelines for capital adequacy in 1993, (3) the inadequacy of government actions 
aimed at resolving the financial crisis and the non-performing loan problem, (4) inadequate 
monetary and fiscal stimulus leading to inadequate aggregate demand, (5) increased 
uncertainty about future prospects for the Japanese economy as well as increased volatility, 
and (6) massive overinvestment in corporate plant and equipment during the bubble years 
(due in large part to overly expansionary monetary policy), which induced firms to sharply 
curtail fixed investment during the post-bubble years as a way of reducing excess capacity 
in the corporate capital stock. 
Turning to authors who emphasize the importance of supply side factors, Hayashi 
and Prescott (2002) find that the prolonged slowdown of the Japanese economy during the 
1990s  was due primarily to the decline in the growth rate of total factor productivity and 
to the reduction in working hours from 44 hours per week to 40 hours per week during the 
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1988-93 period pursuant to the revision of the Labor Standards Law in 1988 and that it was 
not due to the breakdown of the financial system (except during the 1996-98 period).  By 
contrast, Kawamoto (2004) finds little or no decline in the pace of technological change 
during the 1990s and attributes the measured slowdown in productivity growth (and 
economic growth) to cyclical fluctuations in the utilization of capital and labor and in the 
reallocation of inputs across sectors.  As another example, Kobayashi and Inada (2005) 
finds that the economic slowdown during the early 1990s was due to the downward rigidity 
of nominal wages, which increased real wages and induced companies to cut back on 
employment.  Finally, Miyao (2006) finds that, at least since 1993, persistent negative 
productivity shocks have caused the GDP gap to widen and that they also had feedbacks 
effects on aggregate demand by causing long-term growth prospects to deteriorate.    
This discussion has shown that the prolonged slowdown of the Japanese economy 
in the 1990s was due to both demand side and supply side factors and, moreover, that the 
two are often closely interrelated.  Thus, there is no easy answer to the question of 
whether demand side factors or supply side factors were more important, but my reading of 
the data and of the literature convinces me that demand side factors were probably more 
important and that the single most important cause of the prolonged slowdown of the 
Japanese economy in the 1990s was the stagnation of private fixed investment, which in 
turn was caused by overinvestment in plant and equipment during the bubble economy of 
the late 1980s, the collapse of asset prices during the post-bubble period, and an inadequate 
policy response to these events.  In particular, I feel that policy mistakes during the bubble 
period (e.g., overly expansionary monetary policies) as well as during the post-bubble 
period (e.g., overly contractionary fiscal and monetary policies and the inadequacy of 
government actions aimed at resolving the financial crisis and the non-performing loan 
problem) are largely to blame.??  
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I analyzed the causes of the prolonged slowdown of the Japanese 
economy in the 1990s and found that the stagnation of investment, especially private fixed 
investment, was the major culprit of the prolonged slowdown and that the stagnation of 
spending on clothing and footwear, transport, and to a lesser extent, miscellaneous goods 
and services, education, and food and non-alcoholic beverages were the main culprits of the 
stagnation of household consumption.  By contrast, I found that the main factors holding 
up GDP growth were household consumption, government consumption, and net exports 
and that the main factors holding up household consumption growth were spending on 
health, communication, and to a lesser extent, restaurants and hotels and housing-related 
expenditures.  I also found that the stagnation of household consumption was due 
primarily to the stagnation of household disposable income, the decline in household 
wealth (which in turn was due primarily to the collapse of land and equity prices), and to a 
lesser extent, increased uncertainty about the future (especially about old age in general and 
public old-age pensions in particular), the deterioration of future prospects, etc.  Finally, I 
considered whether demand side factors or supply side factors were more important as 
causes of the prolonged slowdown of the Japanese economy in the 1990s and concluded 
that the former (especially misguided government policies) were probably more important. 
Turning to the policy implications of my analysis, my findings suggest that the 
economic policies of the Japanese government were largely misguided during the bubble 
period of the late 1980s as well as during the post-bubble period of the 1990s.  For 
example, monetary policy should have been tightened sooner during the bubble period to 
prevent the persistence of such a pronounced bubble, and conversely, monetary policy 
should have been loosened sooner, more fiscal stimulus should have been provided, and the 
government should have acted sooner to resolve the financial crisis and the non-performing 
loan problem during the post-bubble period.  In particular, the government should have 
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done more to stimulate private investment in housing and plant and equipment as well as 
household consumption, and in my opinion, the best way of doing so would have been to 
introduce temporary and targeted tax breaks for housing and plant and equipment 
investment, household consumption, etc.  There are those who oppose tax breaks of any 
kind because Japan already has the highest government debt-to-GDP ratio of any major 
industrialized nation in the world, but I feel that such temporary and targeted tax breaks 
should have been implemented for the following reasons: (1) the Japanese economy 
required further stimulus to recover more quickly, and in the absence of such stimulus, tax 
revenues declined even further, thereby causing the government debt to increase even 
further, (2) temporary and targeted tax breaks would have increased the government debt 
far less than  more permanent and/or broad-based tax cuts, and (3) the tax breaks would 
have been more effective if they had been temporary because temporary tax breaks would 
have induced firms and consumers to accelerate their purchases of the goods and services 
being targeted in order to take advantage of the tax breaks before they expired.  A 
temporary tax break for housing investment was tried and proved to be successful, 
suggesting that similar temporary tax breaks for investment in plant and equipment, 
research and development, and consumption would also have been effective.  
My analysis suggests that an alternative way of stimulating household 
consumption would have been to reduce uncertainty about the future, especially about old 
age in general and about public old-age pensions in particular--for example by 
fundamentally reforming the public old-age pension system to make it solvent as well as 
equitable.  In 2003, there was a sharp increase not only in the proportion of people saving 
for old age but also in the proportion of people who are worried about old age because of 
the inadequacy of pensions and insurance (see Tables 6-7).  Thus, there was an urgent 
need to allay people’s fears about public old-age pensions, and doing so would have 
conferred the added benefit of stimulating household consumption. 
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Turning finally to policy recommendations that target the supply side, Hayashi and 
Prescott’s (2002) findings imply that subsidies to inefficient firms and declining industries 
should have been discontinued since they presumably lower the overall rate of productivity 
growth.  Such a policy would have brought about an improvement in government finances 
in addition to enhancing productivity growth and hence would have killed two birds with 
one stone.   
Now that the Japanese economic is staging a modest recovery, there may no longer 
be any need for stimulative fiscal and monetary policies, but at the very least, the Japanese 
government should be very cautious about tightening either fiscal or monetary policy until 
the economy has fully recovered to prevent the economy from slipping back into recession. 
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Note: See Table 1 for the definition of consumption. 
Source: The same as Table 1. 
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Component of GDP
Actual final consumption of households 3.59 3 1.56 3 57.24 1 85.40 1
Government actual final consumption 3.54 4 3.22 2 5.45 3 18.64 2
Private gross domestic fixed capital formation 6.11 2 -0.59 5 34.09 2 -11.49 6
   Housing (2.44) (-2.48) (3.54) (-9.27)
   Plant and equipment (7.44) (-0.14) (30.54) (-2.22)
Public gross domestic fixed capital formation 0.85 5 -0.24 4 1.67 4 -1.26 4
   Dwellings (-0.53) (-0.89) (-0.04) (-0.15)
   Plant and equipment (-2.85) (-1.06) (-1.56) (-1.18)
   General government (2.45) (0.02) (3.26) (0.07)
Changes in inventories (inventory investment) 9.56 1 na 6 1.14 5 -4.35 5
Net exports of goods and services 0.78 6 6.39 1 0.42 6 13.07 3
   Exports of goods and services (4.61) (4.26) (9.68) (37.78)
   Imports of goods and services (5.94) (3.63) (9.26) (24.71)
Gross domestic expenditure (product) 3.89 1.14 100.00 100.00
The contribution of component X to real GDP growth was calculated as [X(t2) - X(t1)]*100/[GDP(t2)-
GDP(t1)].
1991-2003
Table 1: The Average Annualized Real Growth Rate and the Contribution to Real GDP Growth of
Each Component of GDP, 1980-2003
1980-91
Notes:  The average annual real growth rate of component X between year t1 and year t2 was calculated as
[(X(t2)-X(t1))**(1/(t2-t1)) - 1]*100.
1980-91 1991-2003
Average Annual Real
Growth Rate (percent)
Contribution to Real
Growth Rate of GDP
The figures to the right of each figure indicate the rank of that figure.
The "actual final consumption expenditure of households" is the sum of the final consumption expenditure of
households and social transfers in kind received.
The Japanese government switched from the fixed base year method to the chain linking method in 2004, but
all data shown in this paper are based on the previous fixed base year method because data based on the
chain linking method are available only since 1994 and are available only for the main aggregates.
Source: Naikakufu Keizai Shakai Sougou Kenkyuusho (Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet
Office, Government of Japan), ed., Kokumin Keizai Keisan Nenpou (Annual Report on National Accounts) ,
2005 edition (Tokyo: Media-Rando Kabushiki Kaisha, 2005).  
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Component of GDP
Actual final consumption of households 62.91 1 60.97 1 64.08 1
Government actual final consumption 6.10 4 5.88 4 7.50 3
Private gross domestic fixed capital formation 19.31 2 24.38 2 19.81 2
   Housing (6.08) (5.21) (3.36)
   Plant and equipment (13.24) (19.17) (16.44)
Public gross domestic fixed capital formation 8.91 3 6.43 3 5.45 4
   Dwellings (0.36) (0.22) (0.17)
   Plant and equipment (2.99) (1.43) (1.10)
   General government (5.57) (4.78) (4.18)
Changes in inventories (inventory investment) 0.34 6 0.62 6 -0.02 6
Net exports of goods and services 2.42 5 1.73 5 3.18 5
   Exports of goods and services (7.87) (8.49) (12.22)
   Imports of goods and services (5.45) (6.76) (9.04)
Gross domestic expenditure (product) 100.00 100.00 100.00
Also see the notes to Table 1.
Source: The same as Table 1.
Table 2: The Composition of GDP, 1980-2003
2003
Note:  The figures show the share of each component of real GDP in real GDP (in percent).
The Share of Each Component in Real GDP
1980 1991
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Component of GDP
Actual final consumption of households -2.03 4 36.34 2
Government actual final consumption -0.32 2 -4.33 5
Private gross domestic fixed capital formation -6.70 5 67.91 1
   Housing (-4.92) (13.05)
   Plant and equipment (-7.59) (54.86)
Public gross domestic fixed capital formation -1.09 3 3.84 4
   Dwellings (-0.36) (0.05)
   Plant and equipment (1.79) (-1.84)
   General government (-2.44) (5.63)
Changes in inventories (inventory investment) na 6 5.22 3
Net exports of goods and services 5.60 1 -8.98 6
   Exports of goods and services (-0.35) (-11.18)
   Imports of goods and services (-0.32) (-2.20)
Gross domestic expenditure (product) -2.75 100.00
Also see the notes to Table 1.
Source: The same as Table 1.
Change in the Growth
Rate, 1980-91 vs. 1991-
2003 (percent)
Contribution to the
Decline in Real GDP
Growth, 1980-91 vs.
1991-2003 (percent)
Table 3: The Decline in the Growth Rate and the Contribution to the Decline in Real GDP Growth of
Each Component of GDP, 1980-2003
Notes: The contribution of each component to the decline in real GDP growth between 1980-91 and 1991-
2003 was calculated as the ratio between the decline in the change in that component between 1980-91 and
1991-2003 and the  decline in the change in GDP between 1980-91 and 1991-2003 (in percent).  "na"
denotes "not available."
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Purpose of Expenditure
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 1.21 10 -0.02 9 5.83 7 -0.21 9
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 1.06 11 -0.17 10 1.03 11 -0.31 10
Clothing and footwear 1.85 8 -2.73 12 3.98 8 -9.83 12
Housing, electricity, gas and water supply 3.76 7 2.19 4 21.15 1 30.11 1
     Imputed service of owner-
     occupied dwellings (4.05) (2.34) (15.68) (22.65)
Furnishings, household equipment and
     household services 5.60 3 1.12 6 6.53 6 3.32 7
Health 3.82 6 3.66 2 10.49 5 26.80 2
     Out-of-pocket (2.04) (2.92) (1.81) (5.98)
     Social benefits in kind received (4.67) (3.95) (8.68) (20.81)
Transport 5.29 5 0.53 8 13.74 3 3.29 8
Communication 7.93 1 11.69 1 1.96 10 15.32 4
Recreation and culture 7.72 2 2.99 3 17.90 2 21.76 3
Education 0.99 12 -1.15 11 0.75 12 -1.52 11
Restaurants and hotels 1.78 9 1.88 5 3.25 9 7.36 5
Miscellaneous goods and services 5.60 3 0.66 7 13.38 4 3.90 6
Domestic final consumption expenditure
     of households 3.61 1.54 100.00 100.00
Source: The same as Table 1.
Annual Annualized Real
Growth Rate (percent)
Contribution to the Real
Growth of Household
Consumption (percent)
1980-91
Table 4: The Average Annualized Real Growth Rate and the Contribution to the Real Growth of
Household Consumption of Each Component of Household Consumption, 1980-2003
1991-2003
The figures to the right of each figure indicate the rank of that figure.
Notes:  The average annual real growth rate of component X between year t1 and year t2 was calculated as
[(X(t2)-X(t1))**(1/(t2-t1)) - 1]*100.
The figure for total consumption in this table do not exactly match the figure for household consumption in
Tables 1-3 because the figures in this table refer to "domestic final consumption expenditure of households"
whereas the figures in Table 1-3 refer to "final consumption expenditure of households," with the difference
between the two being that the former exclude "direct purchases abroad by resident households" and "direct
purchases in the domestic market by non-resident households" whereas the latter include both, and because
the figures in Tables 1-3 include "transfers of individual non-market goods and services" from the
government and from private non-profit institutions serving households whereas the figures in this table do
not.
1980-91 1991-2003
The contribution of component X to the real growth of household consumption C was calculated as [X(t2) -
X(t1)]*100/[C(t2)-C(t1)].
Household consumption is the sum of  the final consumption expenditure of households plus social benefits
in kind received, and the entire amount of social benefits in kind received are included in "health."
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Food and non-alcoholic beverages 19.64 2 15.18 2 12.60 3
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 3.97 9 3.02 10 2.46 11
Clothing and footwear 8.48 5 7.03 7 4.20 9
Housing, electricity, gas and water supply 20.14 1 20.47 1 22.09 1
     Imputed service of owner-
     occupied dwellings (13.64) (14.30) (15.70)
Furnishings, household equipment and
      household services 3.79 10 4.67 9 4.45 8
Health 9.80 3 10.02 5 12.84 2
    Out-of-pocket (3.46) (2.93) (3.44)
    Social benefits in kind received (6.34) (7.10) (9.40)
Transport 8.58 4 10.25 4 9.08 5
Communication 0.71 12 1.12 12 3.50 10
Recreation and culture 6.74 8 10.34 3 12.26 4
Education 3.13 11 2.36 11 1.71 12
Restaurants and hotels 7.24 7 5.95 8 6.19 7
Miscellaneous goods and services 7.78 6 9.59 6 8.63 6
Domestic final consumption expenditure
     of households 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 5: The Composition of Household Consumption, 1980-2003
1980 1991
The Share of  Each Component in Household
Consumption (percent)
2003Purpose of Expenditure
Note: See the notes to Table 4.
Source: The same as Table 1.  
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Purpose of Expenditure
Food and non-alcoholic beverages -1.23 4 15.91 4
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco -1.23 4 3.25 9
Clothing and footwear -4.58 9 27.04 3
Housing, electricity, gas and water supply -1.57 6 6.19 7
     Imputed service of owner-
     occupied dwellings (-1.71) (4.04)
Furnishings, household equipment and
     household services -4.48 8 11.89 5
Health -0.16 3 -16.74 11
     Out-of-pocket (0.88) (-5.17)
     Social benefits in kind received (-0.72) (-11.57)
Transport -4.77 11 31.18 1
Communication 3.77 1 -20.32 12
Recreation and culture -4.73 10 11.46 6
Education -2.15 7 4.55 8
Restaurants and hotels 0.10 2 -3.61 10
Miscellaneous goods and services -4.94 12 29.21 2
Domestic final consumption expenditure
     of households -2.06 100.00
Source: The same as Table 1.
Table 6: The Decline in the Growth Rate and the Contribution to the Decline in the Real
Growth of Household Consumption of Each Component of Household Consumption, 1980-
1991 vs. 1991-2003
Notes: The contribution of each component to the decline in the real growth of household
consumption between 1980-91 and 1991-2003 was calculated as the ratio of the decline in the
change in that component between 1980-91 and 1991-2003 to the decline in the change in
household consumption between 1980-91 and 1991-2003 (in percent).
Also see the notes to Table 4.
Change in the Growth
Rate, 1980-91 vs. 1991-
2003 (percent)
Contribution to the
Decline in the Real
Growth of Household
Consumption, 1980-91
vs. 1991-2003 (percent)
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Calendar
Year Unadjusted Household Saving Rate Adjusted Household Saving Rate
1980 17.3 15.4
1981 18.2 16.2
1982 16.8 14.9
1983 16.2 14.3
1984 16.1 14.3
1985 15.5 13.7
1986 14.8 13.0
1987 13.1 11.5
1988 13.5 11.9
1989 13.6 12.0
1990 13.9 12.3
1991 15.1 13.3
1992 14.2 12.5
1993 13.7 12.0
1994 12.6 11.1
1995 11.9 10.4
1996 9.9 8.5
1997 10.0 8.7
1998 11.2 9.6
1999 10.8 9.3
2000 9.6 8.2
2001 6.7 5.7
2002 7.3 6.1
2003 7.5 6.3
Table 7: Trends in the Household Saving Rate, 1980-2003
Notes: The household saving rate was calculated as the ratio of net household saving to the sum
of net household disposable income and "changes in pension reserves in pension funds,
receivable."  The unadjusted rate does not include "social transfers in kind" in the denominator,
whereas the adjusted rate does.
Source: The same as Table 1.  
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Calendar
Year
Illness and Other
Unforeseen Emergencies Peace of Mind
Living Expenses during Old
Age
1984 75.0 25.7 42.1
1985 77.2 26.4 42.5
1986 75.0 25.3 42.5
1987 76.4 26.1 46.1
1988 77.1 28.0 50.2
1989 80.5 28.7 51.5
1990 74.3 25.7 52.4
1991 73.3 23.7 50.5
1992 68.3 23.0 48.2
1993 70.9 23.5 50.1
1994 69.4 24.2 51.6
1995 71.2 25.2 52.9
1996 69.7 25.9 53.9
1997 69.1 24.9 53.2
1998 73.3 24.5 55.3
1999 71.9 27.5 56.7
2000 67.5 27.1 55.9
2001 69.4 26.2 58.6
2002 69.1 26.9 56.9
2003 73.3 25.4 60.4
2004 65.9 26.0 57.4
2005 66.8 25.3 58.7
Table 8: The Proportion of Respondents Who Are Saving for Each Motive, 1984-2005
Saving Motive
Note: The figures show the proportion of respondents saving for each motive (in percent).
Source: Kin’yuu Kouhou Chuuou Iinkai (The Central Council for Financial Services
Information), ed., Kakei no Kin’yuu Shisan ni kansuru Yoron Chousa (Public Opinion
Survey on Household Financial Assets and Liabilities) , 2005 edition (Tokyo: Kin’yuu
Kouhou Chuuou Iinkai (The Central Council for Financial Services Information), 2005), and
earlier editions of the same.  
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Calendar
Year
The Proportion of Under-60
Respondents Who Are Worried
about Old Age (percent)
The Proportion of Under-60
Respondents Who Are Worried about
Old Age Because Pensions and
Insurance Are Inadequate (percent)
1984 na 49.1
1985 na 60.6
1986 na 64.5
1987 na 63.5
1988 na 69.6
1989 na 71.0
1990 na 68.0
1991 na 60.8
1992 63.7 55.5
1993 62.0 59.5
1994 69.9 59.1
1995 71.6 56.9
1996 71.3 59.0
1997 78.8 63.1
1998 85.5 67.1
1999 84.1 66.9
2000 84.7 68.1
2001 84.3 66.5
2002 86.6 66.7
2003 87.9 72.2
2004 86.1 66.4
2005 84.4 68.1
Table 9: The Proportion of Respondents Who Are Worried about Old Age, 1984-2005
Source: The same as Table 8.
Notes: The denominator in the right-hand column is the number of under-60 respondents
who are worried about old age.  "na" denotes "not available."
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Endnotes 
                                                   
? “Social benefits in kind,” the largest component of “social transfers in kind,” were 
included in household consumption under the older 1968 System of National Accounts to 
which Japan adhered until 2000, and “social transfers in kind” are included in their entirety 
in “actual” household consumption (an alternate consumption concept) under the newer 
1993 System of National Accounts to which Japan has adhered since 2000. 
 
? This conclusion ignores second- and higher-order effects.  For example, the stagnation 
of consumption might have induced firms to cut back on their investment spending.  I am 
indebted to Keunkwan Ryu for this point. 
 
? Since “social benefits in kind” are available only in nominal terms, I converted them into 
real terms using the price deflator for the health component of household consumption. 
 
? The data appear to show that income inequality increased in Japan during the 1990s, but 
Ohtake (2005) argues that the apparent trend toward greater inequality is largely a statistical 
artifact (except in the case of young cohorts) arising from the aging of the population and 
the decline in average household size.  
 
? All of these figures denote the average annualized real rate of growth of household 
disposable income (inclusive of social transfers in kind) deflated by the price deflator for 
actual household consumption (inclusive of social transfers in kind).   
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? The average annualized real rate of decline of household wealth was calculated by 
deflating household wealth by the price deflator for actual household consumption.  Since 
household wealth is evaluated at the end of the each calendar year, I calculated the 
end-of-year price deflator by averaging the price deflators for the fourth quarter of the 
current year and the first quarter of the following year. 
 
? Ando (2002) and Ando, et al. (2003) attribute the stagnation of household wealth in large 
part to the low dividend-payout ratio of Japanese corporations, which is another way of 
saying that Japanese corporations overinvested in physical assets, at least during the bubble 
period.  The high growth rates of private fixed investment during the 1980-91 period in 
Table 1 corroborate Ando’s contention. 
 
? The difference between the two rates is that the latter includes “social transfers in kind” 
in the denominator whereas the former does not.  See the second paragraph of section 2 
for a definition of “social transfers in kind.” 
. 
? It is, of course, possible that households were not able to save more despite their desire 
to do so because of stagnant household income and wealth. 
 
?? This is not surprising because Japan’s public pension system has been periodically 
reformed to keep it solvent in the face of rapid population aging—with contribution rates 
being increased, benefit levels being reduced, and the pensionable age being increased over 
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time (see Horioka (2001)).  
 
?? Saito and Shiratsuka (2003a, 2003b) distinguish between precautionary saving (which 
depends on the magnitude of risks) and saving as a waiting option (which depends on how 
long it takes for uncertainties about the future to be resolved).  They find that 
precautionary saving has been more important since the 1980s but that there is some 
evidence of saving as a waiting option in the 1990s. 
 
?? Also see the papers in Blomstrom, et al. (2003), Callen and Ostrey (2003), Hamada, et 
al. (2004), Harada and Iwata (2002), Iwata and Mikitani (2003), Mikitani and Posen (2000), 
and Saxonhouse and Stern (2004). 
 
?? For example, as Bernanke (2000), Ito (2004), and Posen (1998) argue, the Bank of 
Japan discount rate should not have been cut in February 1987 and should have been raised 
in August 1988 when the Federal Reserve and Bundesbank raised interest rates, monetary 
policy should have been eased more in the early 1990s, fiscal policy should not have been 
tightened in April 1997, the Japanese Government mismanaged the financial crisis of 
1997-98, and the Bank of Japan should not have ended its zero interest rate policy in 
August 2000..  
 
